

that those who so called themselves were, in some sense, followers of Homer. When a Homerid suggests the answer to the question, “Who is the ἡδιστος ἀοιδῶν?” it is natural for him to give the name of Homer—*il miglior fabbro*, to use T. S. Eliot’s phrase.

Cynaethus includes Homer and all the Homeridae in his shift from *I* to *we*. The difficulties in line 174 do not affect this point.⁴ I assume Cynaethus promises that the Homeridae will carry the praise of the Deliades on their (well-attested) travels. This is more likely than that the Deliades will carry the praises of the Homeridae on unknown travels. The alternative reading ἡμέτερον, “we will carry *our* praise,” allows an

easy transition to ἐπὶ δὲ πείσονται, but seems inherently weaker. In each interpretation the Homeridae are referred to by a plural pronoun, as they carry Homer’s epics and their works on their travels.

Cynaethus, with his reference to Homer, reinforces the evidence that Homer, founder of the Homeridae, was blind and lived on Chios, at least in the later stages of his career. If we may judge from the present tense of οἰκεῖ, Cynaethus was a Homerid contemporary with Homer and offers contemporary evidence for the blindness.

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4. I ignore certain other textual points irrelevant to this discussion. However, one problem does bear on my point. At line 171 the MSS of Thucydides read ἀφίμως for ἀμφ’ ἡμέων

and there is a little support for ἀφ’ ὑμέων (as well as ἀφ’ ἡμέων). The dropping of ἡμέων from the text would weaken but not destroy my point (cf. n. 3).

ARISTOTLE *METAPHYSICS* 13. 10. 1086b32–37

ἔτι δὲ οὐδ’ ἐπιστητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα· οὐ γὰρ καθόλου, ἡ δ’ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· δηλον δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τῶν ὁρισμῶν, οὐ γὰρ γίνεταί συλλογισμὸς ὅτι τόδε τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς, εἰ μὴ πᾶν τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς, οὐδ’ ὅτι ὅδε ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν
[*Metaph.* 13. 10. 1086b32–37].

The most recent translator, H. G. Apostle, has rendered this:

Moreover, (2) the elements will not be *knowable*; for they are not universal, but *knowledge* is of universals. This is clear from demonstrations and definitions; for there is no syllogism of the fact that this triangle has its angles equal to two right angles unless every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, nor of the fact that this man is animal unless every man is an animal.¹

Paul Shorey (*CP*, VIII [1913], 90–92) argues that εἰ μὴ does not mean “unless” but “but that,” on the grounds that in the present passage Aristotle is concerned with the apodeictic syllogism which is of τὸ καθόλου (*An. post.* 75b21 ff.). Therefore, this passage cannot be translated so as to commit

Aristotle to a conclusion which is a singular proposition. W. D. Ross, whose translation does not differ substantially from Apostle’s, dismisses Shorey’s view, primarily on the grounds that Aristotle does in fact refer to syllogisms with singular premises (e.g. *An. pr.* 2. 27. 70a16 ff. or 1. 27. 43a37–40).² As we shall see, both Ross and Shorey have failed to take the exact meaning of συλλογισμὸς into account. To illustrate this, let us consider Apostle’s translation of οὐ γὰρ γίνεταί συλλογισμὸς ὅτι . . . as “for there is no syllogism of the fact that . . .”

Some years ago, the Loeb translation of Hugh Tredennick and the lectures of Richard Bosley suggested that συλλογισμὸς may be ambiguous.³ If so, there is a simple explanation of Aristotle’s reference to a singular proposition in the passage above. Let us pause for a moment and consider the usage of the word “syllogism.” Roughly, the feature of the word that concerns us is that it belongs to a class of words which, when taken in the

1. H. G. Apostle (trans.), *Aristotle’s Metaphysics* (Bloomington, 1970).

2. W. D. Ross (ed.), *Aristotle’s Metaphysics* (Oxford, 1970), II, 464.

3. Richard Bosley is the only commentator known to us

who takes the possible ambiguity discussed here seriously, although Tredennick does translate *Metaph.* 13. 10. 1086b35 correctly. Since Tredennick does see that the proper translation must be “conclusion” here, we can only assume that his interpretation does not differ from ours.

form of gerundive nominals (e.g., syllogizing, representing, concluding), exhibit the familiar “ing-ed” ambiguity (to use Wilfrid Sellars’ phrase) and, when taken in the form of the derived nominal (e.g., syllogism, representation, conclusion) exhibit the familiar “act-content” ambiguity. Thus, on the one hand “a representing of a triangle” may be interpreted (1) as referring to an event, namely a *representing* being done by Jones; or (2) as that which is *represented* in the act of representing. On the other hand, the expression, “the representation of a red triangle,” may be understood (1) as the *act* of picturing a red triangle, or (2) as the *content* of the act of picturing a red triangle, namely, the red triangle which is pictured. By parity of reasoning, the word “syllogism” may be taken to refer either to an act or process or to the content or product of an act or process. Generally speaking, members of the class of words in question are not ambiguous in context. For example, very few speakers would confuse the sense of the word “building” in “his building is box-like” with the sense of the word as it appears in “his building the temple at that time was a mistake.” However, in the case of the word “syllogism,” this is precisely the kind of confusion that commentators have made. The result has been the failure to distinguish Aristotle’s use of the word “syllogism” to refer to a product, and hence to a conclusion, from his use of the word to refer to what has been traditionally called a figure consisting of premises and conclusion.

A careful reading of the text reveals that Aristotle often uses *συλλογισμός* instead of *συμπέρασμα*. Thus, just as we might find *τὸ μὲν συμπέρασμα ἔσται ὅτι . . .* (*An. pr.* 1. 21. 39b8) or *τὸ συμπέρασμα ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῷ τῶν Β ὑπάρχειν* (*An. pr.* 1. 21. 39b13–14), so we often encounter constructions such as *ὁ συλλογισμὸς ὅτι τὸ Β τῷ Γ ἐνδέχεται μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν* (*An. pr.* 1. 19. 38a20–21) or *ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ὅτι οὐ παντὶ τῷ Ξ τὸ Ν* (*An. pr.* 1. 5. 27b2–3). Similarly, when Aristotle

thinks there can be no cause for confusion, he will simply use “syllogism” instead of “conclusion” as in *An. pr.* 1. 31. 46b9–10: *ὁ μὲν οὖν συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τὸ Δ ἢ Β ἢ Γ ἅπαν ἔσται . . .* Tredennick recognizes the ambiguity and occasionally renders *συλλογισμὸς* as “conclusion,” e.g., in *An. pr.* 1. 28. 45a6–10 of his Loeb translation. Unfortunately, Tredennick is not consistent; in places where he should understand “syllogism” as “conclusion,” he (along with Ross) fails to do so, with the result that the precision of Aristotle’s thought is destroyed. A case in point is his interpretation of . . . *ὁ αὐτὸς ὅσπερ πρότερον* (*An. pr.* 1. 14. 33a9), where he takes *ὁ αὐτὸς* to refer to a certain sort of figure (instead of to the conclusion with which Aristotle is concerned). As a result, he is led to search for a referent which he finds, rather implausibly, at 1. 13. 32a29 ff. But, if we suppose Aristotle’s intended subject to be a similar type of conclusion, we need not look beyond 1. 14. 33a4.

So far, we have confined ourselves to establishing that *συλλογισμός* is ambiguous. If the analysis is correct, it follows that Apostle’s translation at *Metaph.* 13. 10. 1086b34–35 (. . . “for there is no syllogism of the fact that . . .”) is at best unfortunate, since, in all probability, Aristotle’s use of *συλλογισμός* is simply a preferred way of referring to a conclusion (this remark will be justified in a moment).⁴ Furthermore, the motivation for Shorey’s criticism of Ross’s translation is obvious: Shorey assumed that *ἐκ τῶν ἀποδείξεων* and *συλλογισμός* must be co-referential. On the basis of this assumption, he believed that the position taken by Ross would force us to say that the apodeictic syllogism can *conclude* to a particular. But we have illustrated that the application of the word “syllogism” must be far more general than was previously supposed. It ought to be understood to be at least as general as is indicated by Alfarabi: “sermonem igitur cuius proprietates est uerificare sententiam

4. It ought to be noted that Aristotle’s failure to introduce a technical term for the word “conclusion” before *An. pr.*

1. 8 30a5 resulted from the fact that he had alternative ways of referring to conclusions.

aliquam, nominauerunt antiqui silogismum, siue sit sermo fixus in anima, siue exterior cum uoce.”⁵

The only question which remains is, given that *συλλογισμός* is ambiguous, how do we know that it means “conclusion” in the *Metaphysics* passage quoted at the outset?

Aristotle, in order to avoid Meno’s problem (Plato *Meno* 80D5–8), divides knowledge into actual and potential (*An. post.* 71a29 ff.). Potential knowledge is then said to be prior in the individual (*De an.* 431a1 ff.).⁶ If a man knows *this x*, his knowledge is actual (*De an.* 417b29), but if he knows the universal (i.e., *All x are y*), his knowledge is potential and indefinite (*Metaph.* 13. 10. 1087a14 ff.). Hence, knowledge of the universal is prior to knowledge of *this x*. On the basis of these assumptions, Aristotle argues that, if one were to suppose that a given letter did not

have a common name (or a name in common with anything else), it would be unique (1086b16–33). In fact, it could not even be duplicated, since, in order to do so, we should have to *know* that the purported duplicate was really the *same*. To *know* that two things are the same, however, one must first know the universal which they have in common, and this would amount to knowing that they have a common name. This is impossible *ex hypothesi*, for it was assumed that the given letter did not have a common name. It is precisely this point that Aristotle makes in *Metaph.* 13. 10. 1086b32–37: one could not conclude anything about a particular without prior knowledge of the universal.

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5. Alfarabi, *Liber de scientiis*, Latin translation by Girardo da Cremona, ed. A. G. Palencia, (Madrid, 1932), p. 134. It is probable that Alfarabi did not recognize the use of the word for “syllogism” that we are discussing, even though his characterization is quite general.

6. The sequence of references given in this section could all have been drawn from either *An. post.* or *Metaph.*, where similar points are often made. The sections that appear were chosen only for the reader’s convenience.

HOW TO FLATTER WOMEN: *P. OXY.* 2891

Three scanty fragments from a handbook that was famous in antiquity, Philaenis of Samos’ treatment of love and sex, *Περὶ ἀφροδισίων*,¹ were rescued recently by E. Lobel.² Fragment 3 instructs us how successfully to flatter different kinds of women. But there is a serious textual problem involved here. Lobel’s text reads:

- 3 μὲν, τὴν μὲν [
ὥς ἰσόθρον [[. . .]
5 οἶσαν, τὴν δὲ αἰσχρὰν
ὥς ἐπαφρόδιτον, τ[ὴν
δὲ πρεσβυτέραν ὥς .]
8 ἀν φαιο[.]ωνεινα .]

Lobel comments on line 8: “No Greek word is recorded which is compounded with φαιο-. For this reason I venture to call attention to the theoretical possibility of Φαιο[v]ω-

νειναι, Favoninam, and hasten to append the objections that no such Latin form is attested, that nothing known to me about any meaning of Favonius would make a derivative of it relevant to a flattering way of referring to a middle-aged woman, and that it is hard to believe that a Greek author of the third (or an earlier) century would not find a suitable expression in his own language.” In view of Lobel’s own objections, I think his conjecture Φαιο[v]ωνειναι may safely be dismissed as highly unlikely.

Another attempt at solving the problem was made by R. Merkelbach,³ who suggests the following reading in lines 7–8: ὥς [νέ]αν Φαιο[σ]ών εἶναι. According to Merkelbach, -αο- should be Ionic orthography for -αν-, and Φανσών accusative of a proper name Φανσώ, meaning “die Lichtspenderin” (from

1. On which cf. P. Maas, s.v. “Philaenis,” *RE*, XIX (1938), 2122; and F. W. Walbank, *Historical Commentary on Polybius*, II (Oxford, 1967), 356 f., ad 12. 13. 1.

2. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, XXXIX, edited with notes by E. Lobel (London, 1972), 2891, with a facsimile on P1. 1.

3. *ZPE*, IX (1972), 284.